

Campaign Contributions and U.S. Foreign Policy Outcomes: An Analysis of Cuban American Interests

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To what extent are ethnic minority interest groups able to influence U.S. foreign policy? Current case study research has identified several factors that may condition the ability of diasporic groups to influence foreign policy toward ancestral "homelands." To this point, existing studies have been unable to isolate the impact of campaign contributions from other factors that may influence U.S. foreign policy decision making. The current study uses a combination of conditional and standard logistic regression to examine the impact of Cuban American interest group and individual campaign contributions on a series of votes on key amendments in the 108th and 109th Congresses. Results from the study support the idea that the Cuban diasporic community in the United States has had an impact on U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba. However, there are significant limits to this influence conditioned in part by issue salience.

In 1959, Lawrence H. Fuchs noted, "Despite general awareness of the mutual impact of foreign affairs and the claims of minority groups, there has been surprisingly little systematic examination of the results of this process" (161). Several scholars have since responded to Fuch's call for the advancement of knowledge concerning the impact of ethnic minority interest groups on U.S. foreign policy outcomes. However, there remains a great deal of debate concerning the scope and nature of diasporic influence on U.S. foreign policy. Proponents of ethnic minority influence argue that diasporic communities in the United States are often successful in their efforts to shape foreign policy. Skeptics of ethnic minority influence, by contrast, argue that opportunities for diasporic communities to shape U.S. foreign policy are severely limited by a variety of factors.

In spite of significant progress in the past several decades, the systematic study of ethnic minority influence on U.S. foreign policy remains an incomplete enterprise. The current literature lacks a systematic test of any of the mechanisms that are thought to condition ethnic minority influence on U.S. foreign policy. The current study is designed to test the proposition that ethnic identity group campaign contributions are capable of influencing U.S. foreign policy decision making in Congress. Specifically, I test the impact of campaign contributions by the

Cuban ethnic identity group on congressional foreign policy decisions related to the Cuban embargo.

Understanding the link, or lack thereof, between diasporic PAC contributions and votes is important to a broader understanding of ethnic identity influence on U.S. foreign policy, as well as to our understanding of the broader domestic sources of U.S. foreign policy. As Smith (2000) argues, campaign contributions are a significant source of potential influence in Washington. The ability to raise the funds necessary to make significant campaign contributions is also thought to be one of the factors that explain the comparative success of some diasporic interest groups in their attempt to influence U.S. foreign policy.

Literature Review

Diasporas, Diasporic PACs, and Congressional Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy

At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms *ethnic group*, *ethnic minority group*, *diasporic community*, and *ethnic identity group* are often used interchangeably in the literature. This may be a source of confusion, since the term *diaspora* implies a tie to an ancestral homeland (actual or ascriptive), while the term *ethnic minority group*

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technically requires no such attachment. The *term ethnic identity group* requires an ingroup connection, but not necessarily the feeling of a tie to an ancestral homeland. While these terms are analytically distinct by definition, within the literature they share a common connotation. Ethnic minority groups/diasporic groups/ethnic identity groups share a common ingroup connection coupled with a feeling of belonging to a common ancestral "homeland." It is this connectedness that drives diasporic communities toward increased interest in the affairs of their ethnic kin abroad (Shain 1994–95, 1995).

Do Ethnic Identity Groups Have an Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy?

The literature provides several characteristics of the political system in the United States that help explain ethnic minority influence on foreign policy decision making. Some scholars argue that the distribution of political power in the United States is conducive to diasporic influence. For example, Bard (1994) believes that the pluralist nature of American politics creates an environment where ethnic minority interests are able to influence U.S. foreign policy. Since ethnic minority interests are assumed to monitor the situation in the home state more carefully than other groups, they are likely to assert more influence in a pluralist society.

The nature of the foreign policy landscape in the United States also provides opportunities for ethnic minority influence in U.S. foreign policy decision making. First, many authors argue that the foreign policy environment in the United States is characterized by a lack of consensus on the nature of the basic national interest. Said (1981) argues that the concept of national interest has been replaced by a series of subnational interests. Though the reasons for the collapse of consensus (or whether consensus ever existed) are sometimes debated, isolating the exact culprit is less important than the fact that the lack of consensus in U.S. foreign policy provides a political opening for diasporic groups to assert influence on foreign policy decision making. In fact, Uslander (1998) argues that ethnic minority interest groups are now the most prominent interest groups in the realm of U.S. foreign policy.

Skeptics of ethnic minority influence tend to begin their argument by limiting the potential scope of diasporic power. There is broad agreement, for instance, that there are situations in which Congress is likely to view the cost of compliance with ethnic minority interests as too high. For example, elected officials are not likely to sacrifice a significant foreign policy goal, or to risk direct military

confrontation, solely to gain the support of an ethnic minority group. Garrett (1978) argues that East European ethnic interest groups had little impact on foreign policy decision making during the Cold War because compliance would have meant direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The broader literature treating the relationship between campaign contributions and legislative outcomes mirrors the diasporic influence literature in that both literatures have reached decidedly mixed results on the question of influence. Smith's (1995) comprehensive survey of the contribution literature in this area finds contradictory results in over 35 studies of the relationship between campaign contributions and legislative voting behavior. As Langbein and Lotwis (1990) point out, contradictory findings cut across cross-sectional, time series, single, state, and simultaneous approaches.

A basic examination of existing empirical findings confirms the existence of mixed findings. Several scholars find a significant link between contributions and votes (see, e.g., Baldwin and Magee 2000; Broz 2005; Langbein and Lotwis 1990; Saltzman 1987; Stratmann 2002; Wilhite and Theilmann 1987). The basic theoretical argument behind this link is based on the overriding desire for election and reelection on the part of representatives. Representatives need money to ensure victory, and special interests need to advocate certain types of policy (Grossman and Helpman 1994).

Conversely, Chappell (1982), Grenzke (1989), Wright (1990), and Wawro (2001) find no statistically significant relationship between campaign contributions and votes. The essential theoretical argument here is that there are several other factors that combine to overwhelm any potential impact from campaign contributions. Some of these factors include public opinion, the basic ideological orientation of the representative, the level of technicality of the issue, and the amount of aggregate support on all sides of the issue. Other studies offer more qualified opinions depending on the type of vote (see, e.g., Fellowes and Wolf 2004) or the type of issue (see, e.g., Johnson 1985).

The U.S. foreign policy literature is characterized by a paucity of literature treating the impact of campaign contributions on voting behavior. Most of the literature that does exist treats the issue of international finance and trade. Baldwin and Magee (1999), for example, find that contributions by labor organizations are associated with votes against free trade while business contributions are associated with votes in favor of free trade. Alvarez's (2005) case study of the U.S. sugar lobby finds that sweetener interests in the United States were able to maintain high levels of protection even in the face of falling trade barriers for other agricultural commodities. Broz (2005)

FIGURE 1 Key Events in the Debate over the Cuban Embargo

1960: Comprehensive Trade Embargo Initiated Against Cuba
1962: President Kennedy Expands Embargo
1981: CANF Founded
1992: Cuban Democracy Act Passed
1996: Cuban Liberty and Democracy Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton) Passed
2003: Amendment Cutting Federal Funding for Cuba Travel Ban Passes House and Senate (Removed in Conference Committee under Threat of Presidential Veto)
2004 (February): President Bush Signs Two Executive Orders That Tighten the Embargo
2004 (September): Representative Jim Davis Introduces Amendment to Cut Funding for the New Travel Restrictions. The Amendment Passes by a Vote of 225–174. Senate Inaction Kills the Amendment.
2005: Representative Davis Offers Identical Amendment to 2004. Amendment Fails by a vote of 208–211. Eighteen Representatives Who Voted for the 2004 Amendment Voted Against the 2005 Amendment.

Note: The “key events” are not designed to be exhaustive. The goal here is to provide historical context to the votes that underlie the statistical analysis in this article.

finds that contributions from PACs sponsored by money center banks are associated with votes in favor of international financial rescues. By contrast, Kabashima and Sato (1986) find no relationship between campaign contributions and U.S. protection of the auto industry from Japanese competition.

Debate over the Cuban Embargo

The roots of the Cuban embargo can be traced to the progressive fall of the Batista regime and the rise of Fidel Castro in the late 1950s. Figure 1 presents a summary timeline of the debate over the Cuban embargo.¹ For the purpose of this study, a new phase in the debate began in February of 2004, when George W. Bush signed an executive order that tightened existing restrictions on travel to Cuba. In September of 2004, Representative Jim Davis, a Democrat representing the 11th District in Florida, introduced an amendment to the Transportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies Act for Fiscal Year 2005 that would bar the use of federal funds to enforce the new travel restrictions. The amendment passed by a vote of 225–174. However, the Senate did not take up a similar amendment, effectively ending congressional action on the issue for the year 2004.

In 2005, Representative Davis offered an identical amendment to the same piece of legislation in the House. Ultimately, however, the 2005 version of the Davis Amendment failed by a vote of 208–211. Some of the Representatives voting against the Davis Amendment were

freshman Representatives who replaced previous supporters of the amendment. However, 18 Representatives who voted for the Davis measure in 2004 switched their vote in 2005.

As previous scholars have noted, the Cuban embargo is remarkable both for its substantive continuity and for the number of actors who have been involved in its formulation and evolution. Attempts to end the embargo completely, including the 2004 and 2005 attempts by Representative Charles Rangel of New York, have consistently failed in Congress. Attempts to ease the embargo at the margins have experienced more success. In the context of this study, the significant level of debate that has occurred in Congress provides an excellent opportunity to test the impact of PAC contributions on votes relating to the Cuban embargo.

It is of course the case that the Cuban embargo represents a single foreign policy outcome. The ability to generalize is always a concern in case studies, be they quantitative or qualitative. Though the data used in this study apply only to votes on two attempts to weaken the Cuban embargo, I would argue that there are at least three areas where the results of this case can potentially be generalized to other cases. First, it is the case that ethnic identity groups, especially those that are known for being successful, often focus their efforts on Congress. The Cuban lobby, the pro-Israel lobby, the Armenian American lobby, and the Greek lobby all use PAC contributions to members of Congress as part of their strategy to influence U.S. foreign policy. The results of this study should shed light on the increasing number of cases where diasporic interests decide to target Congress with PAC contributions.

Second, the Cuban American lobby has a largely punitive goal (the maintenance of the Cuban embargo). When we examine other diasporic groups, we also find a large number of punitive goals (including economic sanctions). The results of this study should shed light on punitive cases beyond the Cuban embargo.

Finally, it is the case that ethnic identity groups appear to have different levels of success in their attempts to influence U.S. foreign policy. Even within the case of the Cuban embargo, there are situations where campaign contributions theoretically should matter more than others (see the discussion of issue salience below). If we find that conditions like issue salience matter in the case of the Cuban embargo, it may well be the case that this key variable may help explain the success or failure of other diasporic communities in their efforts to influence U.S. foreign policy.

It is indeed possible that the results of this study may provide a framework for examining foreign policy issues

¹I have also included a more in-depth discussion of the debate concerning the embargo in a supporting information document attached to the electronic version of this article.

beyond those related to diasporic interests. It is important to recognize that diasporic interest groups like the Cuban American identity group are still interest groups. They vary in purpose, unity, organization, resources, and several other factors. The areas of foreign policy that they attempt to influence also vary in several important ways, one of which is addressed in this study. In this sense, results from this study should provide some insight into any foreign policy issue on which interest groups use campaign contributions in an attempt to gain political leverage.

Diasporic Interest Group Theory and Campaign Contributions

The principle theoretical argument that drives the current study is quite simple. Diasporic communities have engaged the U.S. political system using many of the same techniques that purely domestic groups use. Ethnic identity groups form organized interest groups and use these groups as a vehicle to influence U.S. foreign policy. To the extent that diasporic interest groups are like other interest groups, we should expect the success or failure of diasporic interests to be conditioned on many of the same factors as domestic groups.

In order to demonstrate a theoretical link between diasporic campaign contributions and U.S. foreign policy influence, one must also demonstrate that it is worth looking to Congress as a potential locus of important U.S. foreign policy decisions. Traditionally, the U.S. foreign policy literature has focused on the role of the president, and more broadly the role of the executive branch, in U.S. foreign policy. I would argue, however, that the overall role of Congress on U.S. foreign policy is strong enough to warrant the serious consideration of the impact of PAC contributions on foreign policy decisions. Meernik (1993) argues that the end of the Cold War created more opportunities for congressional influence on U.S. foreign policy. Hersman (2000) argues that the rise of individualism and the collapse of pure hierarchy in U.S. foreign policy making have cleared the way for increased congressional entrepreneurship. Carter and Scott (2004) argue that foreign policy entrepreneurship in Congress has become an increasingly important determinant of U.S. foreign policy. Overall, Congress has a strong enough role to play in U.S. foreign policy to make it worthy of consideration.

Should we expect then that campaign contributions have an impact on congressional foreign policy decisions relating to diasporic issues? Smith clearly answers the question of influence via contributions in the affirmative by arguing, "Through contributing money to the cam-

paigns of candidates for the presidency and Congress, ethnic activists have another valuable source of access to decision makers" (2000, 101). Scholars often argue that diasporic PAC money is comparatively easy to acquire because of the relatively narrow focus of such PACs and the lack of competition (or at least the lack of concentrated competition) on issues of importance to diasporic PACs (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006; Smith 2000).²

Hypothesis 1 draws on the basic theoretical proposition that ethnic identity interest groups use the same techniques as domestic interest groups in their attempts to influence policy. Amongst those groups, like the Cuban diasporic community in the United States, which are thought to be powerful, we should find that campaign contributions have an impact on congressional voting behavior.

H1: The probability that a Representative will act in a manner consistent with the pro-embargo position will increase as his or her campaign contributions from pro-embargo PACs increase.

It is important to recognize, however, that ethnic identity interest groups, including the Cuban American group, may encounter factors that make it more or less difficult to influence some foreign policy outcomes. Once again, my theoretical argument is that we should search for limiting factors within the traditional domestic interest group literature as well as the diasporic interest group literature. The diasporic influence literature argues that ethnic identity groups are more likely to succeed when they face a weak, divided, or dispersed opposition (Horowitz 1981). As one might expect, a similar argument exists within the domestic interest group literature on campaign contributions (see, e.g., Grenzke 1990; Strattmann 1991). In the case of the Cuban embargo, the opposition is not weak in the traditional sense. Powerful PACs representing the interests of agribusiness, as well as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, have recently become more vocal opponents of the Cuban embargo. However, both of these interests are dispersed. In other words, the money coming from agribusiness PACs and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is not dedicated solely toward ending the Cuban embargo.

H2: The probability that a Representative will vote in a manner consistent with the anti-embargo position

²It is the case that diasporic interest groups rely on means beyond campaign contributions in their attempts to influence U.S. foreign policy. My argument here is simply that campaign contributions are a critical tool used by ethnic identity groups in their attempt to influence Congress.

will be unrelated to campaign contributions from groups opposed to the embargo.

Second, the traditional domestic interest group literature argues that interest group power varies depending on the salience of an issue. When an issue is less salient to the public, interest groups are more likely to enjoy some level of influence (Grenzke 1990). When the public is indifferent, which often occurs when an issue is very technical or specialized, interest groups have a greater opportunity for influence (Freundreis and Waterman 1985). When ethnic identity interest groups are lobbying on technical, specialized, or less salient issues, they ought to experience more success than when they lobby on more salient issues.

Fortunately, there is a great deal of variance in potential issue salience within votes on the Cuban embargo. For example, the Rangel Amendment to the Transportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act discussed above would simply cut all funding relating to enforcement of the Cuban embargo. By contrast, the Davis Amendment to the same appropriations bill would only have an impact on a limited portion of the embargo as it relates to increased restrictions on family travel. My argument is that the impact of PAC campaign contributions on congressional voting behavior should be higher on a highly technical amendment that alters a small portion of U.S. foreign policy than it is on a more general amendment that fundamentally alters U.S. foreign policy.

H3: The impact of PAC campaign contributions on congressional votes will be higher on more technical/narrow votes than it is on less technical/broad votes. Specifically, the impact of campaign contributions will be higher on Davis Amendment votes than it is on Rangel Amendment votes.

Ideally, it would be possible to further establish the importance of issue salience with a midrange statistical case. In principle, such a case exists. In 2003, the House and Senate passed an amendment to the FY 2004 Transportation Appropriations Bill that would have eliminated funding to enforce the travel ban for all people seeking to visit Cuba. Voting on this bill would have represented an excellent midrange salience case since the bill went further than the Davis Amendment (which only dealt with family travel), but not as far as the Rangel Amendment (which would have eliminated the entire embargo). Unfortunately, there is no parallel vote that could be used to demonstrate vote switching in response to campaign contributions.

Research Design, Data, and Method: Isolating the Impact of Contributions on Legislative Decisions

One of the most fundamental issues faced by scholars examining the relationship between campaign contributions and votes is that of endogeneity. There are several means advanced in the existing literature designed to deal with the endogeneity issue. One common solution is to use a simultaneous equation procedure (see, e.g., Chappell 1982; Wilhite and Theilmann 1987). In this manner, one can eliminate the simultaneity bias that exists because of the potential endogeneity of campaign contributions. Applying this technique is problematic in the case of the Cuban embargo. This is due to the fact that the contributions of diverse and competing interest groups may be determined by diverse factors (Chappell 1982). In other words, it is possible to more fully specify the first equation (the impact of campaign contributions on voting behavior) than it is to specify the second equation (the correlates of PAC contributions).

A second solution to the simultaneity problem is the “difference-in-difference” approach developed by Stratmann (2002) and used more recently by Broz (2005). This technique takes advantage of the fact that Congress often considers similar, or identical, pieces of legislation, over multiple terms. The difference-in-difference method uses either a conditional (fixed effects) logit model or a probit model drawn only from those legislators who change their voting behavior. Since the conditional logit model is a difference estimator, statistical results will measure the degree to which changes in campaign contributions from different groups influence changes in voting behavior (Stratmann 2002).

The current study draws on two statistical approaches with respect to the Cuban embargo. In each case, I first specify a basic logistic regression model that controls for a Representative’s previous behavior on a substantively identical piece of legislation. If campaign contributions “buy” legislative action, the impact of campaign contributions on this action should be robust to statistical control for a Representative’s previous behavior. I also use the difference-in-difference approach to estimate a conditional (fixed effects) logit model of voting behavior on substantively identical pieces of legislation.

The unit of analysis in the basic logistic regression for the Cuban embargo is each Representative’s vote on the 2005 version of the Davis and Rangel Amendments (controlling for each Representative’s vote on the 2004 version of each amendment). In the conditional logit specification, the unit of analysis is the Representative’s vote on

both the 2004 and 2005 versions of the Davis and Rangel Amendments. Since invariant outcomes do not add to the conditional logit model, the result is based on those observations where a Representative changes his or her vote.

The dependent variable in the Cuban embargo analysis is the vote of each member of the House of Representatives on each of the amendments. I code "yea" votes as 1 and "nay" votes as 0. As a result, I expect the coefficient for pro-embargo PAC contributions to be negative. In order to examine the impact of campaign contributions on voting behavior over time, I restrict my analysis to Representatives who voted on both amendments in 2004 and 2005.

The most important independent variable in the Cuban embargo analysis is the change in campaign contributions from pro-embargo PACs over time. I construct the pro-embargo contribution variable by subtracting contributions from the election cycle preceding the 2004 vote on each amendment from campaign contributions received during the election cycle preceding the 2005 vote on each amendment. The result is a variable that measures the increase (or decrease) in pro-embargo PAC contributions. I measure campaign contributions in thousands of dollars. Contribution data are drawn from the Center for Responsive Politics.

It is important to recognize that pro-embargo contributions come from individuals as well as PACs. Most studies that examine the impact of campaign contributions on congressional votes do not examine the impact of individual contributions. This is in large part because determining the motivation behind an individual contribution is problematic. An individual, after all, could contribute to a candidate for reasons completely unrelated to the issue under study. I would argue, however, that it is possible to measure changes in individual pro-embargo campaign contributions in a way that reduces uncertainty concerning the motivation behind the contribution.

To construct a valid measure of individual pro-embargo contributions, I first examine contributions made by individuals to pro-embargo PACs. Individual contributions of 250 dollars or more must be disclosed to the Federal Elections Commission. Since the pro-embargo PACs exist for a single purpose (to apply pressure to the Castro regime in Cuba), I assume that individuals who contribute to these PACs share in that purpose. Second, I use FEC filings to locate the campaign contributions made to individual candidates by individuals who also gave money to one of the pro-embargo PACs.

In order to examine the impact of changes in anti-embargo contributions, I first searched for groups that have opposed the embargo. From the case study literature,

it is clear that a significant segment of the U.S. agribusiness sector opposes the embargo (see, e.g., Haney and Vanderbush 2005). However, it is also clear that portions of the agribusiness sector favor the embargo. For example, the sugar lobby in the United States has been more likely to favor the embargo as a means to eliminate potential competition from Cuban sugar. This division within the agribusiness sector presents challenges to operationalizations that are addressed below. Business groups, led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, have also become opponents of the Cuban embargo in recent years.

I attempt to capture the anti-embargo contributions in three variables. Each of the three variables captures a change in contributions in the same fashion as the pro-embargo variable. The agribusiness variable measures changes in campaign contributions from agribusiness PACs that publicly opposed the embargo. In order to avoid counting contributions from groups like the sugar lobby that support the embargo, I use press releases to determine the status of each agribusiness PAC or coalition of PACs. If the PAC or coalition has not issued a statement opposing the embargo, its contributions are not included. The second variable measures changes in contributions from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which has also announced its opposition to the Cuban embargo. The third variable reflects changes in total anti-embargo contributions by adding the results of the previous two variables.

In addition to the key independent variables, it is necessary to control for factors beyond campaign contributions that may have an impact on votes related to the Cuban embargo. First, as mentioned above, it is necessary to control for a Representative's existing position on the two issues in order to determine whether or not campaign contributions lead or follow behavior. In the basic logit model, I account for a Representative's existing position on the Cuban embargo by controlling for each Representative's previous vote on the Davis and Rangel Amendments.

Second, there are obvious ideological factors that might explain a given Representative's vote with respect to the Cuban embargo. In general, Republicans tend to be more in favor of strengthening and maintaining the Cuban embargo than are Democrats. In this context, it is possible that Republicans in the House were more likely to vote against the Davis and Rangel Amendments as a result of pressure from above. In order to control for the impact of party affiliation, I include a party variable coded 1 if the Representative is a Republican and 0 otherwise. In addition, I control for each Representative's First-Dimension DW-Nominate score. DW-Nominate scores provide an estimate of the Representative's position on a hypothetical

TABLE 1 Logit Analysis of Davis 2005 Amendment

DV: 1 = “yea,” 0 = “nay” ¹	Model 1 (Individual PAC)	Model 2 (Aggregate Totals)
Pro-Embargo PAC Change	−1.665(.852)**	..
Agricultural PAC Change	−.019(.628)	..
Chamber PAC Change	0.442(.313)	..
Total Pro-Embargo Change ²	..	−.596(.261)*
Total Anti-Embargo Change ³	..	.001(.043)
Percent Cuban	−.837(.378)*	−.961(.538)
Percent Agriculture	−.169(.106)	−1.39(.095)
DW-Nominate ⁴	−1.189(.528)*	−1.387(.516)**
Davis04 Vote (1 = “yea”)	5.48(.852)***	5.18(.713)***
Constant	−2.05(.490)***	−2.425(.595)***
Wald X^2	97.28	98.36
P > X^2	.000	.000
Observations	357	357

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001.

¹A “nay” vote is a vote in favor of the Cuban embargo.

²Includes individual contributions. Individual contributions were excluded from Model 1 due to collinearity.

³Includes agribusiness contribution changes added to National Chamber of Commerce contribution changes.

⁴A collinearity issue prevented the inclusion of DW-Nominate and party variables in the same model. When run separately, the substantive impacts were nearly identical. I include the DW-Nominate variable in the table to demonstrate the impact of ideology.

left-to-right ideological scale. My goal in using DW Nominate scores is to control for ideology in the event that it has a distinct impact on Cuban embargo votes.

Finally, it is necessary to control for constituency variables that may be related to votes on Cuban embargo legislation. I include a variable, drawn from U.S. Census data, which measures the percentage of people who identify themselves as Cuban living in each congressional district. Since agribusiness interests tend to oppose the embargo, I also use U.S. Census data to construct a variable measuring the percentage of the population employed in agriculture in each congressional district.

Results

Tables 1 and 2 summarize results for the logistic regression of votes on the Davis and Rangel Amendments. Each table contains the results for two models. The first model includes only the PAC contribution change variables along with each of the control variables. The second model includes the results for total contributions made in favor of the embargo and total contributions made by groups opposed to the embargo. I estimate each model with robust standard errors.

Logistic regression results for the 2005 version of the Davis Amendment, which would have eliminated federal funding for the 2004 revisions to the Cuba travel ban, suggest that pro-embargo PAC contributions had a signif-

icant impact on the propensity of Representatives to vote in favor of maintaining that portion of the embargo. As the Cuban diaspora increased its contributions from one election cycle to the next, Representatives became more likely to oppose the 2005 version of the Davis Amendment. The impact holds true even when one controls for the individual Representative's vote on the identical piece of legislation in 2004. The variable measuring the combined impact of PAC and individual contributions is also statistically significant and in the anticipated direction. Overall, these results lend support to Hypothesis 1.

Patterns in the descriptive statistics suggest that contributions serve both as incentives to change voting behavior as well as rewards for existing behavior.³ For example, the three largest pro-embargo PAC recipients in 2004 (Rodney Alexander R-LA, Mike McIntyre D-NC, and Pete Sessions R-TX) all voted against both versions of the Davis and Rangel Amendments. In other cases, Representatives who received some of the largest increases in PAC funding switched their vote on the Davis Amendment, the Rangel Amendment, or both. Gary Ackerman (D-NY), Frank Pallone (D-NJ), and Eliot Engle (D-NY) received the largest increases among Representatives who switched their vote. Each of these Representatives received increases

³Additional descriptive statistics can be found in the supplemental information file attached to the electronic version of this article. Included amongst the descriptive statistics are average contribution amounts and average contribution changes to Representatives who later switch votes.

TABLE 2 Logit Analysis of Rangel 2005 Amendment

DV: 1 = "yea," 0 = "nay"	Model 1 (Individual PAC)	Model 2 (Aggregate Totals)
Pro-Embargo PAC Change	-.272(.150)	..
Agricultural PAC Change	-.153(.102)	..
Chamber PAC Change	1.05(.495)*	..
Total Pro-Embargo Change	..	-.260(.147)
Total Anti-Embargo Change	..	-.002(.086)
Percent Cuban	-.214(1.27)	-1.708(1.007)
Percent Agriculture	-.119(.108)	-.160(.114)
DW-Nominate	-1.38(.577)*	-1.62(.553)**
Rangel04 Vote (1 = "yea")	7.06(.857)***	6.566(.932)***
Constant	-3.67(.778)***	-3.58(.553)***
Wald X^2	103.94	98.93
$P > X^2$.000	.000
Observations	361	361

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

of between two and three thousand dollars. Several Republicans, including Elton Gallegly of California, received smaller increases and switched their votes. The average increase in pro-embargo PAC contributions among representatives who switched their vote was \$1,138.00.⁴ By contrast, the average increase in pro-embargo PAC contributions to all Representatives was \$274.00.

Individual contributions seem to partially follow the pattern of PAC contributions in that they appear to represent a mixture between rewards for existing behavior and incentives to change behavior. However, the ability to "bundle" individual contributions results in larger total contributions than those from PACs. Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL) received the highest level of individual contributions (just over \$74,000 during the period of this study). Illeana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) was second on the list with over \$54,000 in individual campaign receipts over the same time period. Both Diaz-Balart and Ros-Lehtinen are major Cuban embargo supporters in districts with significant Cuban American populations. Other Representatives, such as Frank Pallone (who also appears on the list above), received an increase in individual campaign contributions and subsequently switched their vote on the Davis and/or Rangel Amendments. The fact that the descriptive data point to a combination of rewards and incentives highlights the need for a statistical model that is able to isolate the incentives. The model presented in this study represents a step forward in that respect.

⁴As I suggest in the conclusion, the relatively small amount of change amongst vote switchers suggests that campaign contributions may serve as a proxy or signal for other forms of direct and indirect lobbying activity.

Turning to anti-embargo contributions, results in Models 1 and 2 (Table 1) provide support for Hypothesis 2. Neither agribusiness PACs nor contributions from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have an impact on voting behavior. The fact, however, that Chamber of Commerce contributions come closer to statistical significance than do agricultural contributions is at least partially consistent with interest group theory. The agribusiness lobby is dispersed, both across issues and PACs. This high level of dispersion appears to restrict influence on Cuban embargo legislation, where there is a concentrated interest group lobbying in favor of the embargo. By contrast, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is dispersed across issues, but operates as a single PAC.

An examination of the control variable results yields few surprises. Support for the Davis Amendment wanes, as expected, as the percentage of Cuban Americans in a district increases. By contrast, the percentage of people employed in agriculture has no impact on support for the Davis Amendment. This is consistent with diasporic interest group theory, which argues that geographically concentrated constituencies tend to have more influence than dispersed constituencies (see, e.g., Smith 2000). The only surprise is that the coefficient on the agricultural constituency variable is in the opposite direction from what one might expect from the literature. This finding may be a function of U.S. Census data aggregating agricultural employment in a way that makes it difficult to distinguish between agricultural employees in export versus import-competing sectors.

The analysis of voting on the Rangel Amendment yields a significant surprise. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, contributions from pro-embargo PACs fall just short of

TABLE 3 Substantive Effects of Key Variables on Predicted Probability of Voting in Favor of the Davis 2005 Amendment (Table 5-1, Model 1)

	Pro-Embargo PAC Change	Chamber PAC Change	DW Nominate	Davis 04	Predicted Probability of a "Yea" Vote
"Average" Condition	.275	-.093	.054	"yea"	.89
Average Condition with a "nay" Vote	.275	-.093	.054	"nay"	.03
Pro-Embargo Increase ("yea" Vote)	1.216	-.093	.054	"yea"	.65
Pro-Embargo Increase ("nay" Vote)	1.216	-.093	.054	"nay"	.01
Chamber Increase	.275	.764	.054	"yea"	.92
Chamber Increase (Previous "nay" Vote)	.275	.764	.054	"nay"	.05
Chamber and Pro-Embargo Increase	1.216	.764	.054	"yea"	.73
Rep Is More Conservative	.275	-.093	.516	"yea"	.82
Rep Is More Liberal	.275	-.093	-.408	"yea"	.93

Notes: Effects on predicted probabilities are based on all variables in Table 1, Model 1.

In the "average" condition, values for all variables are held at their mean. The exception is the Representative's vote on the Davis 2004 Amendment, which is held at its modal value of "yea." Row 2 illustrates the predicted probability of a "yea" vote for Representatives who originally voted "nay" with all other values held at their mean.

Rows 3–6 illustrate the impact of a one standard deviation increase in pro-embargo contributions, National Chamber of Commerce contributions, or both.

Rows 7–8 illustrate the impact of a one standard deviation increase or decrease in the DW Nominate score (first dimension).

statistical significance at the .05 level. As Model 1 (Table 2) demonstrates, contributions from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have a statistically significant and positive impact on support for the 2005 version of the Rangel Amendment. Given my argument above, it is no surprise that U.S. Chamber of Commerce contributions have a greater impact than agribusiness contributions. However, the statistical significance of the Chamber of Commerce contributions is surprising.

We can gain more leverage on the research hypotheses by examining the substantive impact of some of the key variables on support for the Davis and Rangel Amendments. Table 3 examines the impact of changes in some of the key variables on the predicted probability that a Representative will support the 2005 version of the Davis Amendment. The first row of Table 3 illustrates the predicted probability of a "yea" vote on the Davis Amendment under average conditions.

Rows 3–7 help to clarify the impact of increasing campaign contributions from pro- and anti-embargo groups in the election cycle prior to the vote on the 2005 version of the Davis Amendment. A one standard deviation increase in campaign contributions from pro-embargo PACs decreases the predicted probability of a "yea" vote by 0.24 for Representatives who have previously voted in favor of the Davis Amendment. When both pro-embargo and U.S. Chamber of Commerce contributions increase by one standard deviation, the predicted probability of a "yea" vote after a previous "yea" vote is 0.73. Overall, results from Table 3 appear to indicate that the impact of

pro-embargo campaign contributions is greater than the impact of anti-embargo contributions.

On the Rangel Amendment, we find that U.S. Chamber of Commerce contributions have a greater magnitude than pro-embargo contributions. However, the impact of U.S. Chamber of Commerce contributions on Rangel Amendment votes is of relatively low magnitude. Row 6 of Table 4 indicates that an increase in anti-embargo contributions from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has no substantive impact on the predicted probability of a "yea" vote from a Representative who has previously voted "nay." The greatest impact of U.S. Chamber of Commerce contributions is on Representatives who have previously supported the Rangel Amendment.

In order to gain additional insight into the impact of diasporic campaign contributions on foreign policy legislation, I construct two conditional logit models for both the Davis and Rangel Amendments. Results for each model are given in Tables 5 and 6. In essence, the conditional logit models can be used to address the question of whether changes in campaign contributions from pro- and anti-embargo groups have an impact on changes in voting behavior on the Rangel and Davis Amendments.

Model 1 (see Table 5) provides support for the proposition that diasporic PAC campaign contributions have an impact on Cuban embargo legislation. Changes in diasporic PAC contributions over time are indeed related to changes in voting behavior with regard to the Davis Amendment. By contrast, changes in campaign contributions from agribusiness PACs and the U.S. Chamber of

TABLE 4 Substantive Effects of Key Variables on Predicted Probability of Voting in Favor of the Rangel 2005 Amendment (Table 5-2, Model 1)

	Pro-Embargo PAC Change	Chamber PAC Change	DW Nominate	Rangle	Predicted Probability of a "Yea" Vote
Average Condition	.275	-.093	.054	"nay"	.01
"Average" Condition (with a "yea" Vote)	.275	-.093	.054	"yea"	.85
Pro-Embargo Increase ("yea" Vote)	1.216	-.093	.054	"yea"	.82
Pro-Embargo Increase ("nay" Vote)	1.216	-.093	.054	"nay"	.01
Chamber Increase	.275	.764	.054	"yea"	.94
Chamber Increase (Previous "nay" Vote)	.275	.764	.054	"nay"	.01
Chamber and Pro-Embargo Increase	1.216	.764	.054	"yea"	.92
Rep Is More Conservative	.275	-.093	.516	"yea"	.75
Rep Is More Liberal	.275	-.093	-.408	"yea"	.91

Notes: Effects on predicted probabilities are based on all variables in Table 1, Model 1.

In the "average" condition, values for all variables are held at their mean. The exception is the Representative's vote on the Davis 2004 Amendment, which is held at its modal value of "nay." Row 2 illustrates the predicted probability of a "yea" vote for Representatives who originally voted "yea" with all other values held at their mean.

Rows 3–6 illustrate the impact of a one standard deviation increase in pro-embargo contributions, National Chamber of Commerce contributions, or both.

Rows 7–8 illustrate the impact of a one standard deviation increase or decrease in the DW Nominate score (first dimension).

TABLE 5 Conditional Logit Analysis of Changes in Voting Behavior between 2004 and 2005 Versions of the Davis Amendment

DV: 1 = "yea," 0 = "nay"	Model 1 (Individual PAC)	Model 2 (Aggregate Totals)
Pro-Embargo PAC Contributions	-.840(.386)*	..
Agricultural PAC Contributions	.001(.001)	..
National Chamber of Commerce PAC Contributions	1.24(1.225)	..
Total Pro-Embargo Contributions	..	-.443(.335)
Total Anti-Embargo Contributions	..	.001(.001)
Wald X^2	6.31	1.87
$P > X^2$.0974	.392
Observations	46	46

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

TABLE 6 Conditional Logit Analysis of Changes in Voting Behavior between 2004 and 2005 Versions of the Rangel Amendment

DV: 1 = "yea," 0 = "nay"	Model 1 (Individual PAC)	Model 2 (Aggregate Totals)
Pro-Embargo PAC Contributions	-16.409(2.936)***	..
Agricultural PAC Contributions	-.001(.001)	..
National Chamber of Commerce PAC Contributions	16.81(1.09)***	..
Total Pro-Embargo Contributions	..	-18.149(1.703)***
Total Anti-Embargo Contributions	..	-.001(.001)
Wald X^2	558.83	501.99
$P > X^2$.000	.000
Observations	24	24

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Commerce do not have a statistically significant impact on changes in voting behavior amongst Representatives.

In Model 2 neither total pro-embargo contributions nor total anti-embargo contributions have an impact on voting behavior on the Davis Amendment. This is telling, especially with regard to pro-embargo contributions, which combine pro-embargo PAC contributions with contributions from individuals. The statistical significance of PAC contributions, coupled with the insignificance of total contributions, suggests that individuals may well target contributions toward ideologically similar candidates, while PAC contributions are more likely to lead to changes in voting behavior.⁵

Results from the conditional logit model of the Rangel Amendment indicate that both pro-embargo PAC contributions and total pro-embargo contributions have an impact on changes in voting behavior in the House of Representatives. It appears that individual contributions have more of an impact on the Rangel Amendment than they have on the Davis Amendment. This finding is entirely consistent with the broader interest group literature, which suggests that the role of individual constituents (and by extension their contributions) becomes more important as issues become more technically clear and more salient.

Conclusion

The current study began with a decades-old call for the systematic study of diasporic influence. The case of the Cuban embargo demonstrates that such a systematic study is possible. While the statistical test is limited to two attempts at influence, it should provide the basis for more studies of diasporic influence on U.S. foreign policy using attempt-level data.

Overall, the results suggest that, in the case of the Cuban ethnic identity group, campaign contributions do matter in a significant way. The current study demonstrates that campaign contributions are designed to do more than simply reward an existing ideological tendency. Rather, there are cases when ethnic identity group PAC contributions have a leading effect on congressional voting and sponsorship behavior. In the case of the Davis and Rangel Amendments, a small but concentrated group of embargo proponents appears to have outweighed a much larger (but more dispersed) group of embargo opponents.

⁵The impact of individual contributions is not estimated in the conditional logit models due to collinearity issues. When used as a separate variable in a model without PAC contributions, the individual contributions variable fails to reach statistical significance.

In addition to being small in the physical sense, embargo proponents were “small” in the financial sense. Pro-embargo groups were easily outspent by embargo opponents. This suggests the amount of money contributed matters far less than the signal that the money represents. The Cuban American lobby was able to send an unambiguous signal with its contributions. This signal was then more than likely reinforced with intense lobbying efforts by groups like the CANF. By contrast, groups opposed to the embargo were less capable of sending an unambiguous signal due to their dispersion across a variety of issues. Given these two signals, it should be little surprise that decision makers in Congress see more benefits and fewer costs associated in listening to the first signal (even if it does come with less of a financial reward).

It is equally important to note that the preceding analysis points toward limits on the impact of ethnic minority campaign contributions on congressional votes. Specifically, the impact of campaign contributions on votes was far more limited when the issue at hand was clear (non-technical) and likely to be salient to the general public. In addition, voting patterns on the Rangel Amendment suggest that groups opposed to the policy advocated by ethnic identity groups are capable of bringing significant pressure to bear on behalf of their cause.

The Cuban embargo provides a fascinating window into the U.S. foreign policymaking process. Even as the embargo comes under new challenges in the Obama administration, its underlying architecture has survived a variety of political contexts. Whether the embargo continues as a part of U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, it provides a framework for the study of other ethnic identity groups and their impact on U.S. foreign policy. It is the author's hope that the current study provides an additional basis, if an imperfect one, for the continued scientific study of ethnic identity group influence.

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